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LEGISLATION
Temporary Rate Order Statutes and the Due Process Clause
The conditions which courts have imposed as precedent to a valid
exercise of the rate making power by public utility commissions have made
of rate making a long and drawn out process.' Courts demand (i) that the
utility be given a fair hearing with an opportunity to present evidence and
cross-examine witnesses so that there be procedural due process, 2 (2) that
the rate set constitute "fair return on fair value" so as not to be confisca-
tory,8 and (3) that the findings on which the rate order is based be placed
on record to enable the court to review the commission's findings and to
allow the court to determine whether the commission has acted within the
scope of its delegated authority.4 The fair hearing and fact finding require-
ments are but ancillary to the determination of a "fair return on fair value"
and it is the manner in which that concept has been defined by the courts
that has contributed most to the tediousness of the rate making process.
Since Smyth v. Ames,5 the United States Supreme Court has ordained that
the principal factor to be considered in determining valuation is reproduc-
tion cost new. The nebulous nature of reproduction cost requires for its
reasonable approximation exhaustive examination of utility records and
much expert testimony. As a result, rate proceedings have been dragged
out for as long a time as ten years.6
Obviously, therefore, the "fair return on fair value" concept, as now
defined, is unwieldy when there is a demand for quick action. When the
economic trend runs up or down, crises develop. If the trend is up, prices
of raw materials rise, wages increase, costs of services go up, and it often
becomes necessary to adjust rates quickly to save a utility from financial
ruin; if, on the other hand, the trend is down there is a fall in consumer
purchasing power and it becomes imperative, not only to prevent social
repercussions but also to protect industrial consumers who may be near the
financial cracking point, that rates be scaled downward. To tide over such
emergencies legislatures have passed statutes authorizing commissions to
make temporary rate orders,' or commissions on their own motion have
i. See infra note 6.
2. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (18go); Washington ex
rel. Oregon R. R. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510 (1912) ; Georgia Cont. Tel. Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm., 8 F. Supp. 434 (N. D. Ga. 1934) ; Philadelphia v. Public Serv. Comm.,
84 Pa. Super. 135 (1924) ; see Brown, Public Service Commission Procedure (1938)
87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 139.
3. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898); Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public
Util. Comm. of Ohio, 292 U. S. 290 (1934) ; Erie v. Public Serv. Comm., 278 Pa. 512,
123 Atl. 471 (1924) ; see Goddard, The Evolution of Cost of Reproduction as the Rate
Base (1928) 41 H.Av. L. REv. 564.
4. Edison Light & Power Co. v. Driscoll, 21 F. Supp. I (M. D. Pa. 1937); Mus-
kogee Gas & Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma, 81 Okla. 176, 186 Pac. 730 (192o) ; see Feller,
Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
647, 666; Gartner, Is the Rate Making Power of the L C. C. al Unconstitutional Dele-
gation of Legislative Power? (1935) 4 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 26.
5. 169 U. S. 466 (1898).6. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co,, 292 U. S. 151 (1934) ; see Note (1930) 40
YALE L. J. 81, 87.
7. E. g., ALA. CODE ANN. (1928) § 9670; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. iiia,
§ 51; IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) § 14043; N. Y. CoNsor- LAWS (Cahill, Supp.
1935) c. 49, § 114; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 66, § 1150; VA. CODE
ANN. (1936) §4071a; Wis. STAT. (93) § 196.7o.
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made temporary orders considering the power to do so within the general
tenor of their statutory authority."
Very general statutory provisions authorizing temporary rate altera-
tions in emergencies have been in effect in some of the states for a long
time.9 While the courts have usually sustained the constitutionality of such
statutes, they have so conditioned the exercise of power under them, except
where employed to increase the utility's return, as to render them practically
useless. 0 To avoid these conditions, the states of New York, Pennsylvania,
Illinois, and Virginia have enacted laws with specific provisions concerning
valuation, hearings, and recoupments. 13 These statutes are now being con-
stitutionally tested. The New York Court of Appeals has held the New
York statute constitutional and has sustained an order under it.12 On the
other hand, the Pennsylvania statute has been declared unconstitutional by
a federal district court.13 The case has been appealed to the United States
Supreme Court and is to be argued in the near future.1 4 This fact plus the
wide use that commissions have made of temporary rate orders during the
current depression, 5 makes peculiarly pertinent an examination of the devel-
opment of temporary rate orders, a consideration of their constitutional
validity, and an estimate of the effect the power has had and will have on the
whole rate making process.
Temporary Rate Increases
The first use of temporary rate orders was made during and immedi-
ately following the World War.16 In that period, costs rose so suddenly
that a failure to afford utilities relief through higher rates might have
forced many of them to the wall. Commissions, recognizing this, found
that an emergency existed and gave utilities ample increases without any
determination of valuation. In the few instances where objections to in-
creases found their way into the courts, they were summarily dismissed.1 7
8. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Benson, P. U. R. 1933A, 38 (D. C. Minn. 1932);
Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm., 103 Neb. 695, 173 N. W.69o
(I9Ig) ; O'Brien v. Public Util. Comm., 92 N. J. L. 587, io6 Atl. 414 (19) ; Okla-
homa Gas & Elec. Co. v. Corporation Comm., 83 Okla. 281, 201 Pac. 5o5 (1920.
9. E. g., ALA. CODE ANN. (1928) § 967o; IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934)
§ 14043; N. Y. Co0sor. LAws (Cahill, i93o) c. 49, § 72; Wis. STAT. (193i) § i96.7o.
jo. Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U. S. 43 (1923); Indiana General
Service Co. v. McCardle, I F. Supp. 113 (S. D. Ind. 1932) ; New York Edison Co. v.
Maltbie, 244 App. Div. 436, 279 N. Y. Supp. 949 (3d Dep't, 1935) ; Re Wisconsin Tel.
Co., 6 P. U. R. (N. s.) 389 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1935) (see history of litigation
preceding instant order).
ii. ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. iia, § 51; N. Y. CoNsoL LAws (Cahill,
Supp. 1935) c. 49, § 114; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 66, § ii5o; VA.
CODE ANN. (1936) § 4071a.
12. Bronx Gas & Elec. Co. v. Maltbie, 271 N. Y. 364, 3 N. E. (2d) 512 (936),
3 ILt. L. REv. 404, rev'g, 245 App. Div. 419, 283 N. Y. Supp. 839 (3d Dep't, 1935),
which had reversed 153 Misc. 589, 276 N. Y. Supp. 485 (Sup. Ct. 1934), which had
affirmed the commission order, 6 P. U. R. (N. s.) 132 (i935).
13. Edison Light & Power Co. v. Driscoll, 25 F. Supp. 192 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
14. See New York Times, Dec. 20, 1938, p. 37, col. 6.
15. See Swidler, The Uncertainties in the Legal Statis of Temporary Rates (i933)
12 P. U. FORT. 136.
16. Id. at 137.
17. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Hilton, 274 Fed. 384 (D. C. Minn. 1921) ; Chi-
cago Rys. v. Chicago, 292 Ill. i9o, 126 N. E. 585 (1920); State ex rel. Indianapolis
Tractor Co. v. Lewis, 187 Ind. 564, 12o N. E. 129 (i918); Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. v.
Nebraska State Ry. Comm., io3 Neb. 695, 173 N. W. 69o (19io) ; O'Brien v. Public
Util. Comm., 92 N. J. L. 587, io6 Atl. 414 (i919) ; Bartlesville v. Corporation Comm.,
82 Okla. i6o, ig Pac. 396 (192r); La Cross v. Railroad Comm., 172 Wis. 233, 178
N. W. 867 (1920).
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The usual judicial reasoning was that the commission bad properly found
that an emergency existed, that under the circumstances the action of the
commission was not to be judged on the same ground nor tested by the
same conditions as would apply to permanent rate orders, and that only if
an unjust or discriminatory burden was put on the people or the utility
would the court interfere. The only limitation imposed by the courts on the
emergency grants was the requirement of a bond from the utility to insure
reimbursement to the subscribers if on the completion of the valuation
hearing it was found that the temporary rate was fixed too high.18
These cases, developing as they did the principles that emergency rates
were not ipso facto unconstitutional and that valuation was not necessarily
a condition precedent to the validity of an emergency rate, gave birth to the
assumption that commissions could resort to proceedings just as summary
to force rates down when emergencies so required.,,
Temporary Decreases Under Old Statutes
Indeed, when the first cases involving temporary decreases arose, one
of the major arguments advanced in their favor was based on mutuality,
i. e., that since the courts had sustained increases when the utilities were in
financial trouble they should validate decreases now that the consumers
were feeling financial pangs. 0 For various reasons the argument failed
to impress the courts, although, in sustaining a temporary reduction, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the corporate commission which had said:
"It has been the policy of this commission during war times and during the
times of constantly increasing fuel costs, to properly adjust the rates for
utilities . . . so as to keep fuel cost and the rate as near as possible on the
same level. It now becomes its duty when fuel costs are shown to have
decreased . ., to be equally prompt in readjusting the rates in conformity
to such decrease." 21
In the first place, the argument that rates are so high as to be confisca-
tory raises no constitutional issue when advanced by the consumer, but he
must rely solely on the legislative or common law requirement that the util-
ity charge reasonable rates.22 On the other hand, a utility contending that
a rate is so low as to be confiscatory raises a constitutional question under
the due process clause.25 In addition, the utility can advance the procedural
due process requirement of a fair hearing.2 1 Secondly, judicial language to
the effect that a public utility's rates are so graduated that it never enjoys
the advantage of prosperity to the extent to which other concerns do and
that, accordingly, its return in time of business adversity ought not to be
reduced to the same extent as that of unregulated business, may also have
had weight.2 5 Thirdly, while it had been held that the condition of a utility
may require emergency action, there was doubt whether the plight of con-
sumers was to be given the same status,28 although the commissions argued
18. Ibid.
1g. See Swidler, op. cit. supra note i5, at 137.
2o. Ibid.
21. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Corporate Comm., 83 Okla. 281, 283, 201 Pac.
505, 507 (1921).
22. See Note (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 505, 513.
23. See cases cited supra note 3.
24. See cases cited supra note 2.
25. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Wallace, 158 Ore. 210, 275, 75 P. (2d) 942, 968
(1938).
26. See Swidler, op. cit. supra note 15, at 137.
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that it was to be, and it has now been so heldY.2  Finally, while on a decrease
the utility loses all of the difference between the old rate and the new, the
consumer on an increase may be only slightly affected since the increased
burden is divided among many people.
Whatever may be the specific reason, the courts generally have looked
askance at temporary rate reductions under the older statutes, and, either
because the hearing precedent to the order was not such as required by due
process 28 or on the ground that the rate fixed was confiscatory,29 have
almost unanimously declared invalid every temporary rate reduction order
presented to them.80
Prendergast v. New York Telephone Company,81- the only United
States Supreme Court decision on the subject, sounded the death knell of
temporary rate decreases under the old acts, although since that case innu-
merable attempts have been made to sustain such orders. 2 In that case,
the commission, after having taken a great amount of evidence, ordered a
temporary reduction pending the completion of the hearing. The company
sued to restrain enforcement of the order in the federal district court claim-
ing that the rate was confiscatory and, to establish this, relied on evidence
showing that the commission had failed to consider reproduction cost. The
injunction was granted. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the
district court, holding that the rates were final legislative acts for the period
during which they were to remain in effect and as such had to conform to
the due process requirements of a final rate order. In so holding the Court,
in effect, decreed that a temporary rate order had to be preceded by all the
time consuming investigation necessary to validate a final order, the avoid-
ance of which was the purpose of providing for temporary orders.
It was but natural after the Prendergast case that the courts should hit
on inadequacy of the hearing as a further reason for voiding temporary
orders. As has been indicated, the requirement of a fair hearing follows
from the requirement that commissions consider certain valuation criteria
before making a rate order. So the courts were quick to grasp language of
the Supreme Court under the "fair return on fair value" concept which
demanded that, for procedural due process, the utility be allowed to present
evidence on all the elements involved in the determination of value and to
cross-examine witnesses produced by the commission.3 In Indiana General
Service Co. v. McCardle, 4 an injunction against a temporary reduction
was granted because the record disclosed that the hearing occupied only one
27. Re Wisconsin Tel. Co., 6 P. U. R. (N. s.) 389 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1935);
see Indiana General Serv. Co. v. McCardle, I F. Supp. 113, 115 (S. D. Ind. 1932).
28. Indiana General Serv. Co. v. McCardle, i F. Supp. 113 (S. D. Ind. 1932) ; Tri-
State Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Benson, P. U. R. 1933A, 38 (D. C. Minn. 1932) ; Rockland
Light & Power Co. v. Maltbie, 148 Misc. 22, 266 N. Y. Supp. 377 (Sup. Ct. 1933),
aff'd, 241 App. Div. 122, 271 N. Y. Supp. 858 (3d Dep't, 1934).
29. Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U. S. 43 (1923) ; Love v. Atchison, T.
& S. F. Ry., i85 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911) ; Laclede Gas Light Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm., 8 F. Supp. 8o6 (W. D. Mo. 1934) ; New York Edison Co. v. Maltbie, 244 App.
Div. 436, 279 N. Y. Supp. 949 (3d Dep't, 1935) ; Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Maltbie,
242 App. Div. 718, 273 N. Y. Supp. 428 (3d Dep't, 1934) ; cf. King's County Light Co.
v. Maltbie, P. U. R. 1933B, 337 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1933).
3o. See cases cited supra notes 28 and 29.
31. 262 U. S. 43 (1923).
32. See supra notes 1o and 15.
33. See cases cited supra note 2.
34. I F. Supp. 113 (S. D. Ind. 1932).
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day and consisted of testimony of a commission engineer and accountant;
in Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Benson3 5 an injunction was granted because
the company had been given no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses or
to produce witnesses on its own behalf or to make argument on the evidence
received; and in Rockland Light & Power Co. v. Maltbie 86 a temporary
order was held invalid because the company was denied an opportunity to
present an appraisal and other evidence as to the value of its properties.
The Prendergast case, however, did not completely neglect the con-
sumer public. Realizing the necessity for adequate consumer protection,
the court required the utility to post a bond in case the decrease on final
examination was discovered to have been warranted, and then, by way of
dictum, indicated that their decision might have been different had the tem-
porary rate orders been limited in time, and if there was some manner in
which the utility could be protected against loss if it was subsequently
shown that the temporary orders had provided for inadequate return. The
bonding technique as a solution to the problem of protecting consumers may
be dismissed as useless. This is evidenced by the fact that the cost of
making refunds in the Chicago Telephone Rate cases was more than two
and a half million dollars.3 7 Indeed, it has been shown that, in some situa-
tions, accounting and administrative costs would be so high as to absolutely
prohibit such a procedure."' The hopeful part of the decision was the
dictum outlined above indicating, as it did, a possible escape from the diffi-
culty by the adoption of statutes limiting in time the effect of temporary
orders and providing methods whereby the utility could recoup losses sus-
tained through inadequate rates.
Temporary Decreases Under Recent Statutes
Four states now have adopted temporary rate statutes designed to
remedy the deficiencies pointed out in the Prendergast case. 9 In all four
of these statutes, the exercise of power thereunder is conditioned on facts
showing special need. In Illinois and Virginia, the commission must find
that the net income is in excess of a reasonable depression income, while in
Pennsylvania and New York the public interest must demand the summary
action. In addition, the time during which temporary rate orders may
remain in effect is limited. The Virginia and Illinois laws provide that the
orders may be set for a period of not more than nine months or a
further period of three months; the Pennsylvania and New York statutes
provide that the temporary orders are to remain in effect until the final
determination of the proceeding. Criteria of value required to be considered
by the commissions before making a temporary rate order are set forth.
The Virginia and Illinois statutes apparently contemplate an abbreviated
form of the traditional investigation used in rate making and direct the
commissions to examine the books, reports and property of the utilities. In
no case can the amount absorbed by the temporary reduction exceed the net
income over and above a reasonable return. The New York and Pennsyl-
vania acts are much more effective in this respect. Under them value is
35. P. U. P. 1933A, 38 (D. C. Minn. 1932).
36. 148 Misc. 22, 266 N. Y. Supp. 377 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 122,
271 N. Y. Supp. 858 (3d Dep't, 1934).
37. See St. Joseph's Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 89 (1936).
38. See Louisville & N. R. R. v. Railroad Comm., 2o8 Fed. 35, 6o (M. D. Ala.
1913); International Ry. v. Prendergast, 52 F. (2d) 293 (W. D. N. Y. 193o) ; Note
(1937) 46 YALE L. J. 5o5, 510.
39. See supra note ii.
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determined from original cost less accrued depreciation. 0 This ordinarily
can be quickly ascertained from the records and accounts of the utility and
thus is more conducive to a speedy adjustment of rates during depression
periods. The statutes of both states provide for a return of not less than
5% of such value.
The statutes of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia demand notice
to the utility and a hearing, and although no such provision is expressly
contained in the Illinois statute the Illinois Commission has construed it as
requiring a hearing before temporary rates may be fixed. 41 The right of a
utility to a hearing seems thus to have been adequately handled since pro-
cedural due process appears only to require that the utility have the oppor-
tunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses on the criteria of
value on which the temporary rates are based.42  It should be noted that
in the cases that have come up under the New York and Pennsylvania
statutes the courts have expressed no objection based on procedural due
process.43  Finally, all the statutes contain recoupment clauses requiring
reimbursement in the final rates if it is found after complete valuation that
the temporary schedules were too low.
As yet, there has been no litigation in the courts under the Virginia
and Illinois statutes.4" The New York statute was held constitutional by
the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Bronx Gas & Electric Co. v.
Maltbie,45 after the Appellate Division had declared the statute violative of
due process in making original cost less accrued depreciation the criterion
of value.46 The court reasoned that the recoupment clause was a sufficient
safeguard to the utility to validate a temporary order based on a valuation
which, it was admitted, could not constitutionally serve as the basis for a
final rate. In so holding, the court sensibly disregarded the language of the
Prendergast case that a temporary rate was a final rate for the period during
which it was to remain in effect and as such had to conform to the Smyth v.
Ames standard.
4o. Under the New York statute, if the records of the utility fail to show original
cost less accrued depreciation, the commission may estimate it; under the Pennsylvania
statute, if the utility does not have continuing property records, the commission can set
a rate which shall provide a return not less than an amount equal to the operating in-
come for the year i935 or such subsequent year as the commission may deem proper,
to be determined on the basis of data appearing in the utility's annual reports.
In Edisom Light & Power Co. v. DriscoIl, supra note 13, the court did not con-
sider the constitutionality of this provision of the Pennsylvania statute. However, it
gave as one of the reasons for holding the order invalid the fact that the utility had no
continuing property records and that therefore the commission should have proceeded
under this section of the Act rather than under the original cost section. It would seem
that under ordinary circumstances, there should be no constitutional objection to the
section since the utility probably would have applied for an increase if it considered its
income in any particular year to have been inadequate. On the other hand, a rise in
the cost of supplying the service from one year to another conceivably might make
inadequate an income which formerly was sufficient. The existence of such a possibility
may result in this part of the Act being declared unconstitutional because providing for
arbitrary procedure.
41. Illinois Commerce Comm. v. Public Serv. Comm., 4 P. U. R. (N. s.) i (Ill.
Commerce Comm. 1934) ; Re Western United Gas & Elec. Co., Docket No. 22357,
opinion and order of July 9, 1934.
42. See supra note 2.
43. See cases cited infra notes 45, 47, 48 and 5o.
44. Illinois Commerce Comm. v. Public Serv. Comm., 4 P. U. R. (N. s.) I (Ill.
Commerce Comm. 1934) (commission order under the new Illinois statute).
45. 271 N. Y. 364, 3 N. E. (2d) 512 (1936), 31 ILL. L. Rav. 404.
46. 245 App. Div. 419, 283 N. Y. Supp. 839 (3d Dep't, 1935).
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The Pennsylvania statute has come up in three federal district court
cases. In Beaver Valley Water Co. v. Driscoll47 a temporary rate was
enjoined on the ground that it provided only 4% return to the company
instead of the 5% required by the statute. The court refused to consider
the constitutionality of the statute because it was able to rest its decision on
other grounds.
In Edison Light & Power Co. v. Driscoll4 8 the majority of the court,
following Bronx Gas & Electric Co. v. Maltbie, held the statute constitu-
tional, but declared the order invalid because it failed to set forth the ele-
ments considered in fixing fair value. The court, however, refused to grant
a permanent injunction but merely stayed the execution of the order for
fifteen days in order to give the commission an opportunity to state the
elements of fair value on which the temporary rates were based. The dis-
sent 49 cited the Prendergast case to the effect that in regard to due process
there can be no distinction between temporary and final rate orders, and,
therefore, concluded that the statute basing valuation on original cost alone
was unconstitutional.
Soon after the above decision, the commission issued another tempo-
rary order on the same company, this time setting forth the valuation ele-
ments on which the rate was based. The utility sued for an injunction in
the federal court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania.50  The court,
adopting the dissenting opinion of the middle district court case, declared
the statute unconstitutional, and then declared that even if the statute were
constitutional, the order was invalid because the rate of return was only
3.65% while the statute required a return of at least 5%.
Since the Edison Light & Power Co. v. Driscoll case has been appealed to
the United States Supreme Court,51 the final fate of temporary orders under
the new statutes will soon be known.52 The Supreme Court must balance in
the constitutional scales the two lines of thought that have developed,
namely, that of Bronx Light & Gas Co. v. Maltbie to the effect that, where
an emergency requires constitutional principles applicable to the protection
of property from confiscation may be temporarily suspended or modified
so long as the utility can be protected by recoupment; and that of the
Edison Light & Power Co. and Prendergast cases to the effect that whether
temporary or final the same criteria of value must be considered in making
a rate order.
The very fact that under the present valuation formula there is an
acknowledged need for temporary rate orders constrains a belief that the
Court, as now constituted, will sustain the validity of the statutes. The
Court might find ample support in its own decisions to go about so holding
in any one of three different ways.
First, the Prendergast case dictum presents an easy out. It would be
possible for the Court to view that case as holding that a temporary order
must be based on the same valuation formula as a final order only where no
provision is made for the protection of the utility from possible loss through
47. 23 F. Supp. 795 (W. D. Pa. 2938).
48. 21 F. Supp. i (M. D. Pa. 1937), 86 U. oF PA. L. REV. 314 (1938).
49. Id. at 6.
5o. Edison Light & Power Co. v. Driscoll, 25 F. Supp. 192 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
51. See New York Times, Dec. 2o, 1938, p. 37, col. 6.
52. It is unlikely that the Court will avoid the constitutional question by holding
that the rates set were less than the required 5 per cent. because of the conflict among
the Pennsylvania district courts regarding the statute's constitutionality. For another
possibility see the discussion in supra note 4o.
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too low a rate, to, point out that the statute effectively protects the utility,
and to conclude, therefore, that the valuation language of the Prendergast
case is inapplicable. As makeweight argument, the Court might point out
that, at various times, it has sustained "experimental" rate orders with the
observation that the best way to discover whether or not a rate is confiscatory
is to test it out.5 3 The fact that the Pennsylvania statute indicates that a
return as low as 5% may be set will present little difficulty since the Court
has indicated that, in determining fair return, business conditions are to be
considered.54
But a holding like the above would really disregard the fact that the
mandate of the Prendergast case requiring that, temporary or final, a rate
order must be based on traditional valuation concepts, is so broad that it
seems to include all temporary rate orders regardless of protection to the
utility by way of recoupment. So logic would favor a decision that would
in terms overrule the language of the Prendergast case. At various times
legislation to tide over an emergency has been sustained by the courts,
although admittedly such legislation would have been bad if permanent.55
In Block v. Hirsh,5" speaking with reference to the legislation there in-
volved, the Court said: "The regulation is put and justified only as a tem-
porary measure . . . A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well
may justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change." 57
Therefore, a holding sustaining the statute on the ground that in times of
emergency constitutional principles may be temporarily modified or set
aside, especially where the utility is protected by a recoupment provision,
would be perfectly proper.
Such a decision would still not achieve the best legal result. The
basis on which one theory of valuation rather than another prevails
should be that that theory most nearly approaches a true estimate of fair
value.5 8 Yet there is every indication that the adoption of the reproduction
cost new theory by our courts was merely arbitrary. At the time Smyth v.
Ames was decided, the absence of careful recording and accounting systems
made a determination of original cost a virtual impossibility. So it was for
practicable reasons that the Court chose reproduction cost new as the valu-
ation base rather than original cost."9 Now that the commissions of most
53. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. I (igo); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
N. Dak, 216 U. S. 579 (igio) ; Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223
U. S. 655 (1912) ; Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 225 U. S. 430 (912);
Brush Electric Co. v. Galveston, 262 U. S. 443 (1923); cf. Northern Pac. Ry. v. De-
partment of Pub. Works of Wash., 268 U. S. 39 (1925) (pointing out that test rates
are only valid where it is doubtful whether the rate fixed is confiscatory).
54. See Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 292 U. S. 290, 3I
(1934). Cf. Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456 (1924); Illinois
Bell Tel. Co. v. Gilbert, 3 F. Supp. 595 (N. D. Ill. 1933) ; Kankakee Water Co. v. Gil-
bert, P. U. R. 1933B, 145 (E. D. Ill. 1933).
55. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (917) (railway labor act) ; Block v. Hirsh, 256
U. S. 135 (1921) (emergency rent statute) ; Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blais-
dell, z9o U. S. 398 (1934) (mortgage moratorium) ; State ex rel. State Board of Milk
Control v. Newark Milk Co., ii8 N. J. Eq. 504, 179 Atl. I6 (i935) (milk control
act) ; see (i937) 47 YALE L. J. 124.
56. 256 U. S. 135 (192).
57. Id. at i57.
58. The dogma in rate making has been, since Smyth v. Aihes: "Fair return on fair
value". See cases cited supra note 3.
59. See Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 262
U. S. 276, 289 (1923).
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states and the various federal commissions have imposed and are imposing
complete accounting systems on all utilities,60 and especially since the prac-
ticable arguments have shifted in favor of the original cost or prudent in-
vestment 61. theories because of the impossibility of obtaining a quick and
orderly rate adjustment under the present system, it would seem that the
time has come for a reconsideration of the various valuation theories ad-
vanced to determine which most nearly estimates fair value.
The obvious falsity of reproduction cost new as the valuation base can
be demonstrated by a supposititious case. The Tinker Town Railroad
builds a line in 19io between city A and country village B, ten miles away.
Between A and B in i91o there is nothing but farm land so the railroad
acquires a thoroughfare cheaply. In 1939, when a rate proceeding comes
up, the land between A and B is highly residential and very costly. The
Railroad is allowed to show and the commission is required to consider what
it would now cost the Tinker Town Co. to secure the trackage ways through
the residential section. If the Railroad were not a public utility, it would
seem only just that it should reap the rewards of its own foresight. But
fair return to a public utility must be determined with an eye to the fair
treatment of the public. 2 Recently the Supreme Court has shown a tend-
ency away from the reproduction cost new theory. In Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission of Missouri,63 justices
Brandeis and Holmes dissented strongly from the majority opinion follow-
ing Smyth v. Ames; while, in Railroad Commission v. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co.,64 decided last year, the Court sustained a rate based on original
cost over the argument of the dissenting Justices Butler and McReynolds
that in so doing the Court was acting contrary to Smyth v. Ames.05
It is, of course, very improbable that the Court will definitely overrule
Smyth v. Ames and the many cases following it 66 in deciding the Pennsyl-
vania case, but it is not unlikely that the present evidences of dissatisfaction
eventually will culminate in such action. The fact remains that the Court
could decide the statute was constitutional because the reproduction cost
theory had outlived its usefulness and that the real criterion for determining
value should be original cost. With such a decision the necessity for tem-
porary rate statutes and temporary rate orders would disappear.
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article comparing the original cost and prudent investment theories and showing their
similarity in the normal situation see Nichols, What Is the So-called Prudent Invest-
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(1933) c. 14.
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